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1. Introduction 
 
Since patents and trade secrets have generally been perceived as mutually exclusive, with few 
exception the law and economics literature has separately concentrated on the design of optimal 
patent policy and on the design of optimal trade secret policy.1 However, while the interest in 
optimal patent design is long standing and has given rise to large literature in the field, whose 
origins can be dated back to Nordhaus (1969),2 the issue of the optimal strength of trade secret 
protection has received little attention until a short time ago. Only recently, starting from a 
provocative paper by Bone (1998), some authors have widely discussed the question of whether 
trade secret deserves a legal protection which goes beyond the contract law or the tort law.3 In 
the words of Lemley (2008), “Trade secret law is a puzzle. Courts and scholars have struggled 
for over a century to figure out why we protect trade secrets. …It seems odd, though, for the law 
to encourage secrets …..I argue that, paradoxically, trade secret law actually encourages 
disclosure, not secrecy. Without legal protection, companies in certain industries would invest 
too much in keeping secrets.” In a similar vein  Risch (2007) maintains that “trade secret are 
justified by the economic benefits that flow from their existence, most notably incentives for 
businesses to spend less money protecting secret information or attempting to appropriate secret 
information”. According to both authors, the reduction of such costs is a sufficient reason for 
the existence of a trade secret law as a separate doctrine, whereas Bone (1998) has an opposite 
opinion. 
The papers cited above prevalently refer to cases in which a proprietary innovation is 
protected by trade secret only.4 However, in spite of the common misperception of an 
alternative between patents and trade secrets, an innovator can use both intellectual property 
rights to protect different aspects of the same invention, as “courts have long held that a 
published patent does not invalidate those trade secrets that are not disclosed in the patent” 
                                               
1
 In some papers the choice between patent and trade secret protection is explicitly considered, but the 
strength of trade secret protection is treated as exogenous (e.g., Gallini, 1992; Denicolò and Franzoni, 
2008; Cugno and Ottoz, 2006). For a discussion regarding the interplay between optimal patent and trade 
secret protection, see Erkal (2004). A general discussion on how innovator can prefer secret to patent 
protection can be found in Friedman, Landes and Posner (1991). 
2
 A selection of the first contributions includes Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer 
(1990), Gallini (1992). 
3
 Previously, Friedman, Landes and Posner (1991) have yet maintained that, since the law does not 
protect against the loss of trade secrets by accident or by reverse engineering, there is in a sense no law of 
trade secret as such, concluding that there are good economic reasons for this. See also Landes and Posner 
(2003). 
4
 In Risch (2010) patent-secret mixtures are considered. 
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(Garvey and Baluch, 2007).5 Trade secrets can, in fact, “be used in lieu of patents but, more 
importantly, they can be relied upon at the same time and side by side with patents to protect 
any given invention…. With patents and trade secrets it is clearly possible to cover additional 
subject matter, and thereby exploit the overlap and strengthen exclusivity” (Jorda, 2008). 
To illustrate how patent and secret can coexist we can assume, for example, that at the time 
the patent was filed the incumbent firm disclosed the best mode for carrying out the invention; 
successively, the incumbent firm discovers a better best mode which it can keep secret without 
bearing the risk of patent invalidation. A possible alternative hypothesis is that the proprietary 
product consists of several parts, some of which are patented while others are kept secret. 
However that may be, with respect to the case where patents and trade secrets are mutually 
exclusive for an innovation on the whole, mixtures of the two protection tools put a specific 
policy issue. To explain why, assume for simplicity a patent scope so broad as to make any non-
infringing imitation impossible. Then, if the innovator can chose to protect its proprietary 
product through patent or secret but cannot combine the two form of protection, the policy 
maker’s problem consists in the first place in setting the duration of patent protection and the 
scope of trade secret law that induce the innovator to choose the socially preferable form of 
protection, given the incentive to innovate. Thus, as Denicolò e Franzoni (2008) pointed out, it 
may be the case that social efficiency requires that the duration of patent protection, relative to 
the strength of secret protection, be such that the innovator’s choice falls on the patent itself. If, 
instead, the innovating technology can be protected jointly by patents and secrets and expected 
secrets’ duration is longer than patents’ life, policy makers have to solve a different problem. 
First of all, note that if the innovator can enjoy full patent protection without disclosing all 
components of its proprietary knowledge, a lengthening in patent life would not have any 
effects on disclosure decision: in enlarging the disclosure of its technology, the innovator would 
have nothing to gain and something to lose. Then, the relevant issue becomes: given the patent 
duration, what is the socially optimal scope of trade secret law for innovations covered by a 
patent-secret mix? Or, in other words, since innovations covered by a patent-secret mix enjoy 
the prospect of some protection even after the patent expiration −that is, they are over protected 
                                               
5
 Interesting examples of patent-secret mix reported by Arora (1997) include German organic dyestuff in 
the nineteenth century, the Haber Bosch process for producing ammonia, the industrial diamond process 
technology by General Electric in the fifties. Court decisions such as C&F Packing v. IBP and Pizza Hut 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) illustrated by Jorda (2007) and Celeritas Technologies v. Rockwell International (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) provide more recent examples of a complementary use of patents and trade secrets. Moreover, 
it is well known that in the software industry source code secrecy frequently complements patents. 
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with respect to comparable innovations covered only by patents− does society benefit from a 
low scope of trade secret law? 
In this paper we attempt to face this issue by using a model in which the social cost 
associated with the mixtures of patents and trade secrets includes, besides dead-weight losses 
and innovative R&D costs, the costs borne by an entrant trying to duplicate that part of the 
technology protected by trade secret. Leaving aside, for sake of simplicity, costs sustained by 
the two firms to protect or illicitly obtain information,6 we focus on the relations between 
duplication costs (by legal means) and social welfare, along the lines of previous models present 
in the literature (Gallini, 1992; Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002; Denicolò and Franzoni, 2008). A 
special feature of our model is nevertheless the relation between duplication expenses, the 
probability of duplication success, and the scope of trade secret law. 
Considering a situation in which transaction costs of trade secret licensing are prohibitive, 
we determine conditions under which a strong legal protection of trade secret is socially 
beneficial even if it implies innovator’s over-rewarding. This is due to the fact that in our model 
a broad scope of trade secret law has beneficial effects on the incentive to invest in R&D for the 
original innovator and permits society to save on wasteful duplication costs borne by a potential 
entrant. These benefits may more than compensate the reduction in the probability of 
competitive entry. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented and some legal issues 
are briefly discussed. Section 3 is dedicated to the design of optimal secret protection when 
secrets complement patents and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Employee mobility, knowledge spillover, and duplication costs 
 
The model we will put forward in Subsection 2.2 below refers to a duopoly environment where 
employee mobility is subject to some contractual and legal restrictions intended to limit 
spillovers of proprietary non patented information. The scope of trade secret protection is 
identified with the strength of these restrictions, which we shortly expound in the following 
subsection. 
 
 
                                               
6
 Accurate analyses of the relation between costs incurred by rival firms in order to protect or 
misappropriate secret information and the scope of trade secret law can be found in the cited papers by 
Bone, (1998), Risch, (2007), and Lemley (2008). 
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2.1. Labor mobility restrictions 
Apart form clearly illegal means for appropriating secret information, such as industrial 
espionage, employee mobility seems to be the main cause of technology spillovers between 
firms.7 To the purpose of limiting harmful losses of proprietary information, in employment 
contracts firms may insert post-employment clauses, known as “post-employment covenants not 
to compete”. In the absence of these covenants, in some cases firms may still resort to a lawsuit 
by appealing to the “inevitable disclosure doctrine” or similar arguments. The scope of trade 
secret law largely depends on the degree of jurisdictions’ acceptance (and enforcement) of these 
protection tools. 
While post-employment covenants consist of promises by employees not to work for a 
competitor for a specified period after employment ends, the inevitable disclosure doctrine 
refers to cases in which such covenants are not signed in the hiring contracts or during the 
employment relationships. This legal doctrine assumes that “if an employee has knowledge of 
trade secrets, and accepts a similar job with a direct competitor in a highly competitive firm, he 
or she will “inevitably” disclose the trade secrets in the course of performing his or her new 
employment duties” (Paetkau, 2003), so that when the former employer would suffer 
“irreparable harm” from disclosure this sort of employee mobility should be restricted 
irrespective of the existence of post-employment covenants. Classical cases where the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine has been adopted are PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond (7th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1262 
and IBM v. Papermaster, 2008 WL 4974508 (S.D.N.Y.), where the notion of “irreparable harm” 
is introduced. An example of rejection is Schlage Lock Company v. Whyte (2002) 101 Cal. App. 
4th 1443. 
It is worth noting that while enforceability of post-employment covenants not to compete 
are provided for by the law in almost all U.S. and E.U. jurisdictions, with more or less 
differences and with the notable exception of California where they are banned, the adoption of 
inevitable disclosure doctrine is typical of several, but not all, U.S. courts. Besides California, 
where the doctrine is explicitly refused, some jurisdictions such as Michigan, Missouri, 
Maryland and Minnesota expressed a few reservations about its application. Despite European 
courts never refer to some form of inevitable disclosure doctrine, something similar has 
nevertheless been formulated by the Court of Appeals of Paris in a case reported by Thiébart 
(2003), where the employee did not signed any post-employment restrictive clause. In its 
decision rendered on November 10, 1994, the court ruled that “if it is legitimate, in all cases, 
                                               
7
 With reference to high technology districts see, for example, Saxenian (1994) and Gilson (1999).  
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that an employee harvest the fruit of the experience he gained with prior employers, which 
constitutes for the employee a normal factor of enhanced value, this does not justify unfair 
behavior which can consist in disorganizing a former employer by massive employee departure 
or in disclosing manufacturing secrets and technical or commercial knowledge in order to 
enable the latter to capture the clients of the former employer”.  
In any case, where the inevitable disclosure doctrine −or some equivalent argument− is 
adopted, the scope of trade secret law tends to be broader than elsewhere. For example, applying 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine, in PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond the court analogized PepsiCo’s 
position with respect to a former employee who was about to be hired by a competitor (Quaker) 
as similar to that of “a coach who had lost a valuable player to the opposing team, playbook in 
hand, on the night before a decisive game. Accordingly, it affirmed the district court order 
enjoining Redmond from assuming his position at Quaker and preventing him forever from 
disclosing PepsiCo trade secrets and confidential information” (Kaplan and Hanlon, 2004)  
The differences in conditions for enforceability of post-employment covenants mainly 
concern geographical and temporal restrictions, employees’ job positions with respect to access 
to trade secrets, and employee financial compensations. For example, financial compensation to 
the employee must be explicitly provided for in employment contracts (personal or collective) 
in almost all E.U. states, while other jurisdictions −notably, the overwhelming majority of states 
in the U.S., Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and, inside E.U., Great Britain− do not require special 
consideration in labor contracts for worker’s agreement to a non competition covenant.8 As far 
as California is concerned, Business and Professions Code section 16600 provides that “every 
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business 
of any kind is to that extent void.” Californian courts have interpreted section 16600 “as broadly 
as its language reads”,9 so that they not only reject the doctrine of inevitable disclosure, but they 
also refuse to enforce post-employment covenants. See Gilson (1999), where the high labor 
turnover in Silicon Valley is ascribed to the weakness of trade secret protection in California, in 
contrast with the low employee mobility in Route 128 district governed by Massachusetts trade 
secret law. 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 Source http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/downloads/judges06/nc.pdf. 
 
9
 Scott v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc. 732 F. Supp. 1034, 1042 (N.D. Cal 1990). 
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2.2. The model 
 
First, let’s distinguish between pre- and post-innovation stages. In the post-innovation stage, a 
firm, labeled I  (innovator/incumbent), owns a proprietary product jointly protected by patents, 
whose normalized length is T ,10 and trade secrets, which have no fixed expiration date.11 
Patents are assumed to be broad enough to make any non-infringing imitation impossible, so 
that competitors cannot enter the market before patent’s expiration −that is, we assume that the 
disclosed part of the technology is protected by ironclad patens, and no imitating product can be 
obtained without it. As a consequence of this assumption the overall strength of patent 
protection is fully captured by the patent’s life. At the patent expiration date a new firm, called 
firm E  (entrant), is founded. This new-generation firm will attempt to duplicate the secret 
information by spending resources at this aim: it will enter the market bearing the same 
production costs of firm I , if duplication is successful, or higher costs −those associated with 
the information disclosed in the patent− if the duplication attempt fails. 
We assume that each employee of the incumbent firm has only a piece, more or less 
important, of information on the whole set of secrets owned by his or her employer.12 To the 
purpose of duplicating the secret parts of firm s'I  technology, firm E  may take advantage of 
some knowledge spillover, whose intensity essentially depends on how easily firm s'I  
employees can join the new generation firm. Employee mobility in turn depends on the scope of 
trade secret law, more specifically on the enforceability of post-employment covenants not to 
compete, and on the adoption or rejection by courts of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (in the 
U.S.) or similar legal arguments. For example, under California law, which bans covenants not 
to compete and refuses the inevitably disclosure doctrine, employee mobility practically has no 
limits: in our meaning, the scope of trade secret law is at a minimum. Elsewhere, covenants non 
to compete are enforceable if they respect some more or less restrictive standards, according to 
which labor mobility is more or less facilitated. Note that a typical standard regards covenants’ 
duration (often 3 or 5 years after the employment relationship has been terminated): but even if 
                                               
10
 Given a patent life of t  years, the normalized length is defined as rteT −−= 1 , where r  is the discount 
rate. 
11
 Although an innovator can often choose the extent patents and trade secrets combine with one another, 
in this paper we assume a given patent-secret mix. For a model where the patent-secret mix results from a 
maximizing choice, see Ottoz and Cugno (2008). 
12
 Fragmentation of secret information is a common defensive practice. It is the most prominent example 
of what Risch (2007) refers to as a “non-standard” precautionary measure. 
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their validity is limited in time, enforcement of such agreements make up a hindrance to labor 
mobility, so reducing knowledge spillover (Gilson, 1994; Hyde, 2003; see also Fudenberg and 
Tirole, 1983, p. 529). 
By utilizing the set of information obtained through employee mobility, whatever its 
dimension, at time T  firm E  will spend resources to duplicate all components of firm s'I  
technology protected by trade secret. Given the sum spent for duplication, called EK , the 
probability of success, γ , will increase with the dimension of the set of disposable information, 
which in turn diminishes as the scope of trade secret law increases. In what follows, for sake of 
simplicity we treat the scope of trade secret law as a continuous variable depending on the 
conditions required by the relevant courts for enforcing post-employment covenants or applying 
the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
On these bases, and adopting the usual convexity hypothesis for a cost function, we assume 
that the probability of duplication success, the duplication effort, and the scope of trade secret 
law, are linked by the relation 
)(γθgK E = , (1) 
where 0)0( =g , 0)(' >γg , 0)('' >γg  and the shift parameter θ  is a measure of the 
duplication difficulty which increases as the scope of trade secret law is broadened. Note that 
this approach is very similar to the one adopted by Takalo (1998) in a model with costly patent 
imitation: the only difference is that in our case the duplication difficulty depends on the 
strength of trade secret protection, not on patent breadth. 
If the attempt is successful, from time T  firm E  will compete on the same technological 
footing with firm I , so that it will obtain for ever a stream of symmetric-cost duopoly profits 
equal to ESDpi . If the attempt fails, firm E  may enter the market with a production cost 
associated with the information disclosed in the patent application, that is with higher costs than 
firm I . In this case firm E  will gain a stream of asymmetric-cost profits ESD
E
AD pipi <≤0 . Given 
that r  represents the discount rate, firm E  will then choose γ  by maximizing the expected rent 
)()1( γθγpipiγ g
r
R
E
SD
E
ADE
−
+−
= . (2) 
If an interior solution exists, the privately optimal value of γ  will be determined by 
θ
pipiγ
r
g
E
AD
E
SD −
=)(' , (3) 
from which 
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So, as it was logical to expect, an increase in the scope of trade secret law reduces the 
privately optimal level of γ . 
Let’s now go backward to the pre-innovation stage. In analogy with the cost function (1), 
suppose that the innovation effort, IK , and the probability of success, β , are linked by the 
relation )(βfK I = , where 0)0( =f , 0)(' >βf , 0)('' >βf . We consider two opposite 
possibilities: unanticipated and anticipated concealability. 
• Unanticipated concealability. Suppose that when deciding R&D expenses the innovator does 
not expect that some pieces of the technology to be discovered will be concealable without 
incurring the risk of losing patents’ protection on the whole proprietary product. Only if and 
after the innovation has been achieved, this possibility becomes clear. This means that the 
innovator’s expected rent is 
)()1( βpipiβ f
r
T
r
TR
I
SDMI
−





−+= , (5) 
where Mpi  and 
I
SDpi  are, respectively, the flow of monopoly profits granted by patents and the 
innovator’s profit flow under symmetric-cost duopoly. Then, if IR  has an interior maximum, 
the privately optimal value of β  will be determined by 
r
T
r
Tf
I
SDM pipiβ )1()(' −+= , (6) 
from which 0/ =θβ dd . 
If the inventive effort is successful and the entire technology is disclosed and patented, the 
present value of innovator’s profits obviously will be rTrT ISDM /)1(/ pipi −+ . But if some 
relevant pieces of technology can be unexpectedly not disclosed in the patent filings, with 
probability γ−1  after patents’ expiration the innovator will enjoy the flow of profit IADpi  
associated with the cost asymmetry granted by trade-secrets, so that the present value of 
innovator’s expected profits will be rTrT ISD
I
ADM /))1)((1(/ γpipiγpi +−−+ . Since ISDIAD pipi > , in 
this case, and in a certain sense, the innovator turns out to be over rewarded: while the 
expectation of monopoly profits during the patents’ life and symmetric-duopoly profits after 
patents’ expiration would be sufficient incentives to R&D effort in fact borne, with probability 
γ−1  the innovator will enjoy additional advantages from the non-disclosed information. 
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Since under the above assumptions the gains associated with concealability do not depend 
on programmed R&D expenses, the pieces of technology unexpectedly concealable can be 
analogized to serendipitous inventions. This implies that the incentive to innovate depends only 
on patents’ duration, while the scope of trade secret law determines how much the patent-secret 
holder is potentially over rewarded with respect to the remuneration that would be sufficient to 
induce the R&D expenses actually incurred. So, in this case we can study the social effects of 
duplication activities in a comparable way with the relevant strand of literature that justifies (or 
does not justify) the existence of specific trade secrets laws on the ground of their ability to 
reduce private expenses in protection costs, while creating incentives to innovate is considered a 
very minor justification (Bone, 1998; Landes and Posner, 2003; Risch, 2007; Lemley, 2008).13  
• Anticipated concealability. If the innovator knows in advance that some parts of the 
technology to be discovered will be protectable through trade secret, its expected rent becomes 
)()1()1( βγpipiγpiβ f
r
T
r
TR
I
SD
I
ADMI
−




 +−
−+= , (7) 
so that the privately optimal β  will be determined by 
r
T
r
Tf
I
SD
I
ADM γpipiγpiβ +−−+= )1()1()(' ,  (8) 
from which, by using equation (4), 0/ >θβ dd . 
In this case, unlike in the previous one, the scope of trade secret law affects the innovator’s 
decisions −that is, the incentive to innovate depends now, besides on patents’ duration, on the 
strength of trade secret protection. As we will see, this implies that the range of parameters over 
which a broad scope of trade secret law is socially efficient turns out to be expanded with 
respect to the case of unanticipated concealability. 
 
3. Choosing the scope of trade secret law 
 
In this section we first use our simple duopoly model to determine the optimal scope of trade 
secret law for a given patent length. In doing this we assume that, due to high transaction costs, 
trade secret licensing is not mutually convenient. Then we consider some special cases 
characterized by different market behaviors. 
                                               
13
 Other related works are that which formalizes the social consequences of the private choice between 
patent and trade secret protection in the light of the contract theory of patents (Denicolò and Franzoni, 
2004, 2008; Cugno and Ottoz, 2006). Even here, intellectual property laws are viewed exclusively in their 
role in incentivizing cost-saving. 
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3.1. Optimal scope 
 
Let’s indicate with M∆  the stream of dead-weight loss associated with monopoly, with SD∆  the 
stream associated with symmetric-cost duopoly, and with AD∆  the stream associated with 
asymmetric-cost duopoly. With probability γ−1  firm E  is not successful in the duplication 
attempt so that after patent expiration firm I  will enjoy a production cost advantage. In this 
case the stream of dead-weight loss will be M∆  during patent life and MAD ∆≤∆  soon after the 
expiration date. If, on the opposite, firm E  is successful in the duplication attempt, after patent 
expiration the stream of deadweight loss will be ADSD ∆<∆ . This event has probability γ . The 
post-innovation expected social cost, SC , is the sum of the expected present value of dead-
weight losses and of the present value of the cost borne by firm E  to duplicate the secret. Then, 






+
∆−+∆
−+
∆
= )()1()1( γθγγ g
r
T
r
TSC ADSDM , (9) 
so that the present value of expected social welfare turns out to be 
)()( ββ fSCSWSW −−= , (10) 
where SW  stands for the present value of social welfare that would prevail under perfect 
competition. 
Maximizing SW  with respect to θ  and T  under the constraints that the innovator and the 
duplicator choose R&D and duplication expenses in the privately optimal ways described 
above, we in general can determine the socially optimal combination of patent length and trade 
secret scope for innovations of the kind we are dealing with. As the choice of patent length is, 
nevertheless, relevant also for innovations whose components are all protectable only by 
patents, may be that policy makers whish to fix T  in order to not penalize this second type of 
innovations. If so, the problem becomes that of verifying if a reduction in the scope of trade 
secret law, facilitating in prospect competitive entry, enhances social welfare. Propositions 1 
and 2 below show that under certain conditions the opposite happens. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to define the elasticity of probability of firm s'E  duplication 
success with respect to the expense for duplication. As we will see, this elasticity, given by 
γγγγγη )('/)()/)(/( ggKdKd EE == , will turn to be crucial for our result. 
Proposition 1. Unanticipated concealability. Suppose the innovator does not anticipate that 
some pieces of the technology to be discovered will be concealable. Then, the condition 
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E
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SDAD
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d
pipi
γ
γ
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−
∆−∆
>+   for all )1,0(∈γ  (11)  
is sufficient and necessary for social welfare to be monotonically increasing in the scope of 
trade secret law . 
Proof. Since in this case 0/ =θβ dd  (see equation (6)), differentiating SW  in equation (10) we 
have )/(/ θβθ ddSCddSW −= . By using equations (3), (4) and (9) we can verify that if 
E
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−
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 (12) 
this derivative is positive. (See the Appendix for details.) On the other hand, differentiating 
γγγη )('/)( gg=  and rearranging terms, we have 
γ
γ
ηη
γ
γγγ
d
d
g
ggg
+=
−
2
2
))('(
)('')())('(
. (13) 
Thus, inequality (12) corresponds to inequality (11). The statement immediately follows. ■ 
The rationale of Proposition 1 is that when condition (11) holds a high legal protection of 
trade secret allows society to save on duplication costs that would be otherwise borne by firm 
E : this saving may be sufficient to more than compensate the increase of the expected present 
value of dead-weight losses caused by the reduction of the probability that the duplication 
attempt is successful14 Although it may seem odd that these social benefits can be more likely 
obtained just for high levels of the elasticity η , that is when at the margin duplication expenses 
are more likely to involve reductions in the present value of expected deadweight losses, the 
reason stays on the incentive effects of high levels of this elasticity. In fact, it is precisely a high 
marginal (expected) productivity of duplication expenses in terms of the probability γ  that may 
create incentives to invest in duplication too strong from a social point of view. In other words, 
for η  high and θ  low private optimality implies investments in duplication too high relative to 
the expected benefits on social welfare. 
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 It is worthwhile noticing that the hypotheses we have formulated on the relation between γ , k  and θ  
are crucial for the above result. Other models assume that the probability of success in duplicating the 
secret technology is equal to 1 provided that the entrant invests a given amount of resources for that 
purpose and that there exists a positive probability (obviously smaller than 1) of total leakage of the 
secret. (See Denicolò and Franzoni, 2008; see also Gallini, 1992, where the duplication cost of the secret 
doesn’t play any role, but there is a probability of total leakage and a probability equal to 1 of non 
infringing patent imitation if the imitator invests for that goal a sufficient sum.) In these circumstances, if 
the probability of total leakage is negatively affected by the scope of trade secret law, it would be always 
optimal to adopt a policy of minimum trade secret protection. In fact, as duplication expenses do not 
depend on policy makers’ choices, it would be advisable to get the maximum probability of total leakage. 
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Proposition 2. Anticipated concealability. If the innovator anticipate that some part of the 
technology to be discovered will be concealable, the range of parameters over which social 
welfare increases with the scope of trade secret law is broader than that identified in Proposition 
1. 
Proof. Some calculations involving equations (7), (8) and (10) show that in this case 
)/)()(/1()/(/ θββθβθ ddRSWddSCddSW I−+−= . The statement follows from the facts 
that: (i) IRSW >  (besides the expected innovator’s rent, expected social welfare comprehends 
the expected entrant’s rent and consumer surplus); (ii) 0/ >θβ dd  (see equation (8)); and (iii) 
under the assumption underlying Proposition 1 θddSW /  is positive if and only if 
0)/( >− θβ ddSC . ■ 
Obviously, the above result is due to the effects on the incentive to innovate that a broad 
scope of trade secret law has in the case of anticipated concealability but not in the opposite 
case. Under anticipated concealability, a broadening in the scope of trade secret law increases 
R&D expenses, but the positive effects through the probability β  overweighs this increment in 
costs, enhancing social welfare for any given SC . Then, condition (11) of Proposition 1 is no 
longer necessary, but only sufficient, for social welfare to be increasing in the scope of trade 
secret law. 
 
3.2. Reverse engineering, protection costs, and rent dissipation 
 
In Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) the authors argument that “When a particular means of 
reverse engineering makes competitive copying too cheap, easy, or rapid, innovators may be 
unable to recoup R&D expenses. If so, it may be reasonable to regulate that means. Anti-plug-
mold laws … are an example. Using a competitor’s product as a “plug” to make a mold from 
which to make competing products permits competitive copying that is so cheap and fast that it 
undermines the incentives to invest in designing an innovative product. Restrictions on plug-
molding may restore adequate incentives to make such investments”. Provided that the cost of 
reverse engineering is high enough, according to the authors the innovator can prevent it 
entirely, especially if a licensing strategy for preventing unlicensed entry is adopted. In this 
case, licensing will be on terms that permit the innovator to recoup its R&D expenses, while at 
the same time constraining the exercise of market power in order to dissuade other potential 
entrants. As a consequence, society saves on wasteful duplication costs. 
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Since regulation of reverse engineering can be viewed as equivalent to a broadening in the 
scope of trade secret law, our result partially parallels the above arguments. We show, however, 
that society can gain from making duplication more difficult even when, due to high transaction 
costs, licensing is not an option. Note moreover that these social gains are independent of any 
possible reduction in innovator’s expenses on protection against misappropriation caused by a 
broadening of trade secret law. If we were considering the arguments in Risch (2007) and 
Lemley (2008) that information-owners’ expenses to prevent illegal appropriation efforts 
diminishes as the strength of legal trade-secret protection increases, our result would be 
reinforced in that the range over which a broad scope of trade secret law is efficient would be 
expanded. 
Finally, note that in terms of the rent dissipation theory our result can be reed as follows. At 
the patent expiration, duplicator’s entry implies a decrease in producer surplus (because joint 
duopoly profits are less than monopoly profits) and increases consumer surplus. Moreover, the 
entrant firm will spent some money in attempting duplication of trade-secrets. Thus, if the sum 
of duplication expenses plus the reduction in joint profits outweighs the increase in consumer 
surplus, at the social level we have a (partial) post-invention rent dissipation − the second type 
of rent dissipation envisaged by Grady and Alexander (1991). Under condition (11) in 
Proposition 1, this type of rent dissipation is minimized when the scope of trade secret law is at 
a maximum. 
 
3.3. Some special cases 
 
To gain more insights into the meaning and relevance of condition (11) in Proposition 1 it is 
useful to consider different market behaviors under linear output demand and constant marginal 
costs. Assume therefore the inverse demand function QaP −= , where P  is market price and 
Q  is total output. Also assume that, with respect to the superior technology which allows to 
produce at constant marginal costs equal to zero, the inferior technology implies a constant cost 
disadvantage equal to ε .15 Under the above linearity assumptions and the additional hypothesis 
that the function )(γg  is iso-elastic ( 0/ =γη dd ), condition (11) can be written 
E
ADAD
E
SDSD
SD
E
ADAD
ADSD
SDAD
qPqP
PqP
)(
))(2/1())(2/1( 22
ε
ε
pipi
η
−−
−+
=
−
∆−∆
> , (14) 
                                               
15
 No loss of generality is implied by setting marginal costs associated with the superior technology equal 
to zero. If these costs were supposed positive, the demand function could simply be rescaled to produce 
the same results.  
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where Eiq , ADSDi ,= , stands for firm s'E  output.
16
 In what follows we will examine Cournot 
competition (integrated with limit pricing), Stackelberg competition with the incumbent firm 
acting as the quantity leader, collusion, and incumbent’s post-patent monopoly. In this way we 
can obtain approximate numeric information about the pairs ),( εη  for which, given the market 
behavior, condition (11) in Proposition 1 is fulfilled. 
• Cournot competition. Suppose 2/aPM =<ε , where MP  stands for monopoly price. Under 
Cournot duopoly, where each firm chooses a quantity to produce that maximizes its profit flow 
given the expectation that the rival firm maintains its output level fixed, firm s'E  outputs and 
market prices are given by 3/aqESD = , 3/)2( ε−= aqEAD , 3/aPSD = , 3/)( ε+= aPAD . Then, 
condition (14) becomes 
 
ε
εη
88
118
−
−
>
a
a
. 
Since the ratio )88/()118( εε −− aa  decreases as ε  increases, approaching the value of 
8/5  as ε  tends to the point 2/a , at which and above the incumbent firm enjoys full monopoly 
power even after patent expiration, a necessary condition for inequality (14) to be satisfied is 
8/5>η . For 8/5>η  inequality (14) can be fulfilled provided that ε  is sufficiently high (see 
the shaded zone in Figure 1, panel i).17 In particular, this event is the more likely the more 
relevant is the secret part of technology in terms of production costs and the more productive is 
at the margin the expense for duplication, that is for high levels of ε  and η . This is due to the 
fact that for any θ  duplication becomes more attractive as ε  and η  increase, so that a strong 
trade secret protection permits the society to save resources whose amount exceeds the expected 
present value of dead-weight losses associated with no duplication. 
                                               
16
 Since Pareto-optimal output is equal to a , deadweight-loss triangles are given by 
221=−21 ))(/()()/( iii PQaP , ADSDi ,= . When ADi = , we must add the total extra cost born by firm 
E , that is EADqε . 
17
 Note that the elasticity η  is upper bounded at 1  because the assumptions 0)('' <kg  and η  = constant 
are incompatible with 1≥η . 
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• Cournot competition and limit pricing. In considering the above kind of competition we have 
ignored that when firm E  fails in its duplication attempt the incumbent can prefer to deter entry 
by resorting to a limit pricing strategy, that is by setting the price at ε=ADP . Specifically, 
comparing the value of the incumbent’s profit flow under limit pricing with the corresponding 
value under asymmetric-cost Cournot duopoly, we can verify that limit pricing turns out to be a 
superior alternative for the incumbent if 2/5/ aa << ε .18 Suppose then that the two firms 
compete à la Cournot when the entrant succeeds in duplicating the secret technology or, if it 
does not succeed, when 5/a<ε . Otherwise, the incumbent adopts a limit pricing strategy, so 
that if the entrant firm fails the duplication attempt and ε<5/a , its output will be zero. Then, 
since for 2/5/ aa << ε  we have 3/aqESD = , 0=EADq ,   3/aPSD = , ε=ADP , while for 5/a<ε  
the results for Cournot competition hold, condition (14) becomes 
 



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
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>
.
25
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2
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Contrary to what happens in the case illustrated in panel i of Figure 1, the right-hand part of 
the inequality 222 2)9( aa−> εη , starting from negative levels for 3/a=ε , increases with ε  
                                               
18
 The incumbent’s profit flow under asymmetric-cost Cournot duopoly is given by 9+ 2 /)( εa . 
Comparing this value with the profit flow under limit pricing, )( εε −a , it follows that limit pricing turns 
out to be a strictly superior alternative for the incumbent if and only if 0<+7−10 22 aaεε , which 
implies 2<<5 // aa ε . 
η  
1  
8
5
 
Figure 1. Condition (14) under Cournot competition (panel i) and limit pricing 
(panel ii). 
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until reaching the value of 8/5  at the point 2/a=ε , at which entry is no more a problem for 
the incumbent. This is explained by the fact that under limit pricing, while AD∆  increases with 
ε  as under Cournot competition, EADpi  is null for all ε . It follows that 3/5/ aa << ε , or 
2/5/ aa << ε  together with 8/5>η , are sufficient conditions for inequality (14) to be 
fulfilled (see the shaded zone in Figure 1, panel ii). In these intervals, expected deadweight 
losses associated with no duplication are so small, or duplication is so attractive, that a strong 
trade secret protection which allows to save duplication expenses turns out to be beneficial for 
society. 
• Stackelberg competition. Suppose again 2/aPM =<ε . Under Stackelberg competition, with 
firm I  being the quantity leader, firm E  maximizes its profit flow treating firm s'I  output as 
given. In turn, firm I  maximizes its profit anticipating firm s'E  reaction. The equilibrium firm 
s'E  quantities and market prices are 4/aqESD = , [ ]0,/)3(max aaqEAD ε−= , 4/aPSD = ,   
[ ]3/,4/)(min aaPAD ε+= . Then, condition (14) becomes 
 





−
−
>
18
7
,
1812
2310
max
ε
εη
a
a
. 
As under Cournot competition, there exists a level of η  below which inequality (14) cannot 
be fulfilled. Since for 3/a≥ε  firm s'E  output is zero, this level is now 18/7=η . As ε  
decreases in the interval 3/0 a<< ε , the ratio )1812/()2310( εε −− aa  increases, until reaching 
the value 6/5  at 0=ε . Thus, condition (14) turns out to be more likely fulfilled under 
Stackelberg than under Cournot competition (see the shaded zone in Figure 2). The reason for 
this is that in the ideal passage from Cournot to Stackelberg competition, for each 3/a<ε  both 
the differences SDAD ∆−∆  and 
E
AD
E
SD pipi −  decrease, but SDAD ∆−∆  decreases more than 
E
AD
E
SD pipi − .
19
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 Under Stackelberg competition there exists no 3< /aε  such that limit pricing is a privately superior 
alternative. This can be viewed by comparing the incumbent’s profit flows under asymmetric-cost 
Stackelberg duopoly, given by 8+ 2 /)( εa , with the profit flow under limit pricing, that is )( εε −a . For 
2<<3 // aa ε  limit pricing and Stackelberg solutions coincide. 
 18 
 
• Collusion. Antitrust notwithstanding, it may be that the two firms collude, in the sense that 
firm I  pays firm E  a fee, negatively related to the cost differential, and firm E  stays out of the 
market. If this is a real possibility, condition (14) is surely respected: in fact, since 
MADSD PPP ==  and 0=
E
ADq , condition (14) reduces to 0>η , that is, it is fulfilled for any 
relevant pair ),( εη .20 
• Incumbent’s post-patent monopoly. Until now we have assumed that 2/a<ε . If 2/a≥ε  and 
firm E  fails its duplication attempt, firm I  continues to enjoy full monopoly power beyond the 
date of patent expiration. In this case, when the two firms compete à la Cournot if the 
duplication attempt succeeds, market prices and firm s'E  outputs in condition (14) will be 
3/aqESD = , 0=
E
ADq , 3/aPSD = , 2/aPP MAD == . Then, condition (14) reduces to 8/5>η . 
When, instead, the incumbent can act as a Stackelberg quantity leader, we have 4/aqESD = ,   
0=EADq ,  4/aPSD = , 2/aPP MAD == , and condition (14) becomes 2/3>η , which cannot 
hold.21 Summing up, when entry does not occur because of a cost differential greater than the 
monopoly price and η  is constant, condition (14) can be fulfilled under potential Cournot 
competition but not if the incumbent firm is able to act as a Stackelberg leader. 
 
 
 
                                               
20
 Note that under collusion ESDpi  and EADpi  are given by the fees paid by firm I  in the two situations. 
21
 See footnote 17 above. 
Figure 2. Condition (14) under Stackelberg competition 
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3.4. The elasticity of duplication probability 
 
We have seen that under Cournot competition a necessary condition for inequality (14) to hold 
is 625.08/5 =>η . Likewise, under Stackelberg competition inequality (14) cannot be fulfilled 
if η  does not exceed the value 388.018/7 = . As there is no empirical evidence on the value of 
η  −which measures the elasticity of individual probability of duplication success with respect 
to the individual expense for duplication− the only thing we can say is that likely it varies 
greatly according to the innovation type, in the same way as the elasticity of the supply of 
inventions −which can be viewed as the elasticity of the aggregate probability of invention 
success, empirically proxied by the number of patent applications, with respect to aggregate 
research expenses− appears to vary greatly across sectors and over time (see Denicolò, 2007, 
and the literature cited therein).22 Since something similar seems to hold for the cost differential 
ε , the only conclusion we can sensibly drawn is that there may exist particular market 
situations where fulfillment of condition (14) cannot be excluded. Obviously, at the present no 
policy implication can be deducted, either for the aggregate or for specific sectors. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We presented a simple model in which an incumbent firm owns a proprietary product protected 
by a mixture of patents and trade secrets. At the patents’ expiration date an entrant tries to 
duplicate the secret part of the incumbent’s technology, with a probability of success depending 
on the amount of resources devoted to this aim and on the quantity of usable knowledge spilled 
out of the incumbent firm, which in turn depends on the scope of trade secret law. Then, when 
the patent will expire the competitor will enter the market at the same production cost as the 
incumbent if duplication is successful, or higher costs if the duplication attempt fails. We 
showed that in this context, under some conditions a broad scope of trade secret law may be 
socially beneficial, either if the innovator, when deciding R&D expenses, anticipates that some 
pieces of the technology to be discovered will be concealable, or if concealability becomes a 
serendipitous opportunity after the innovation has been achieved. 
                                               
22
 Available estimates of the elasticity of the supply of inventions range from about 0.3 to about 1, 
depending on data sets and estimation methods. This great variability of estimates just suggests that the 
true elasticity may vary across sectors and over time. 
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For example, in a linear Cournot duopoly a sufficient condition for a strong trade secret 
protection to be socially beneficial is that the secret part of technology is rather relevant in terms 
of production costs and the probability of duplication success is sufficiently elastic with respect 
to the expenses for duplication. This result holds for a wider range of parameters when the 
incumbent firm can act as a Stackelberg leader or adopts a limit pricing strategy or colludes with 
the entrant. In any case, independently of the innovator’s forecasting ability, a strong trade 
secret protection may be collectively efficient in that it allows society to save on duplication 
costs that would otherwise be borne by the entrant firm: such saving may be sufficient to more 
than compensate the relatively high expected present value of dead-weight losses associated 
with a low probability that the duplication attempt is successful. 
 
Appendix 
 
Differentiating equation (10) with 0/ =θβ dd  we have 
 
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that is, by using equations (4) to eliminate θγ dd /  and rearranging terms, 
 




 ∆−∆
−−
−
=−= )(')('')())('()(''
1 2 γ
θ
γγγ
γ
β
θ
β
θ
g
r
ggg
g
T
d
dSC
d
dSW SDAD
. 
At this point it is easy to verify that θddSW /  turns out to be positive if and only if 
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that is, by using equation (3), if and only if 
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which is inequality (12) in the proof of Proposition 1. 
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